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Xi Jinping’s first term as China’s new president has been jam-packedwith ambition and action. It began with his nationalistic call to pursuethe “Chinese Dream” (zhongguomeng 中国梦 ), a vision aimed at
China’s national rejuvenation but decidedly straying from the 2008 Beijing
Olympics slogan, “One World, One Dream.” Then came the campaign against
corruption and graft in the upper echelons of the Party, during which a hand-
ful of important officials were impeached, one of them the former Chongqing
Party secretary, princeling rising star Bo Xilai. Following close afterward was
a “mass line” rectification campaign that vowed to clean up the four unde-
sirable work styles, featuring self-criticism meetings among Party cadres as
well as a movement against liberal elements in the media and civil society. 
Meanwhile, a heated debate on constitutional government has also
emerged. Fought by liberal reformists and party conservatives, the debate
was staged under a partly wishful and partly strategic optimism that Xi
might rekindle the long-interrupted political reform. On the one hand, liberal
reformists drew inspiration from Xi’s open-minded remarks in a speech de-
livered on the 30th anniversary of the 1982 Constitution in December 2012.
Xi said, “No organisation or individual has the privilege to overstep the Con-
stitution and the law, and any violation of the Constitution and the law
must be investigated.” (1) Liberals read Xi’s comment as a sign of his deter-
mination to undertake a liberal overhaul of the political system. Deliberately
leveraging this optimism, they urged the Communist Party (CCP) to uphold
constitutional government, ensure the rights enshrined in the Chinese Con-
stitution, and set up checks and balances on the power of the Party-state. 
In response, a loose coalition of conservatives, including party ideologues and
leftist intellectuals, responded by unleashing a spate of ferocious counterat-
tacks in a number of key Party publications. Adopting an ideological stance,
they argued that constitutional government is a by-product of Western capi-
talism, incompatible with China’s own practice of socialism, and that China’s
political system must reflect the country’s social and cultural conditions. In
this respect, China is incompatible with Western notions such as constitution-
alism, representative democracy, the separation of powers, and judicial inde-
pendence. They argued that the campaign for constitutional government was
part of a malicious Western plot to subvert the CCP, just as Gorbachev’s con-
stitutional reform brought about the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
This essay examines the arguments in the debate by situating it in the
current status of the Constitution and its future role in China’s political life.
First, it looks at the state of the Chinese Constitution, its unfulfilled promises,
and the obstacles to full implementation. Second, it reviews the current
episode of constitutional debate and summarises the arguments both for
and against implementing constitutionalism in China. It seeks to show that,
despite the Party’s tolerance of the on-going intellectual debate on consti-
tutionalism, the recent crackdown against civil society suggests that Party
leaders have made a conservative move against the actual practice of con-
stitutional government, which diminishes hopes for genuine political reform. 
China’s quest for constitutional government
The struggle for a constitutional state has been a perennial theme for more
than a century in China. The earliest experiment could be traced to the con-
stitutional reforms in the late Qing. At that time, moderate reformers fol-
lowed the footsteps of Japan to establish a constitutional monarchy, but
soon failed in the wake of a brewing revolution. Then in the Republican Era
came various attempts to establish a constitutional state, but none of them
were successful, given the frequent infighting between Republican warlords.
Neither did the KMT government under Chiang Kai-shek achieve much suc-
cess after reunification. Although the government issued the “Constitutional
Draft of May 5th” (wuwu xiancao 五五宪草) in 1936, the vote for a new Con-
stitution was called off by the rapid escalation of the Japanese invasion. (2)
Up to then, China had remained an authoritarian single party state for a
decade. Despite the existence of a constitution, citizens’ rights were mostly
suspended, and the KMT was notorious for terror tactics against suspected
communists and political opponents. In response, the Communists, trying
to increase their popularity, took advantage of the Second United Front to
press for constitutional government. In February 1940, Mao Zedong spoke
at the opening ceremony of the Yan’an Association for the Promotion of
Constitutional Government. His speech, entitled “Constitutional Govern-
ment under New Democracy” (Xin minzhu zhuyi de xianzheng 新民主主义
的宪政), harshly criticised the KMT’s one-party dictatorship and called for
a new-democratic constitutional government. (3)
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Communist support for constitutional government turned out to be an
expedient strategy once the Party seized power in 1949. The People’s Re-
public of China promulgated robust constitutions, but not the promised
constitutional government. Three earlier versions of the Constitution, en-
acted in 1954, 1975, and 1978, not only failed to check the swelling power
of the Party-state but also ignored citizens’ rights that had been enshrined
in the constitutions. 
The current Constitution, ratified in 1982, is China’s longest-functioning
constitutional document. (4) Drafted by a committee of constitutional the-
orists, it reflected Deng Xiaoping’s resolve to lay an institutional and legal
framework for China’s reform and opening. It dropped the notion of class
struggle, placed top priority on economic development, and incorporated
non-Party members into the modernisation drive. The 138 articles of the
constitution make no mention of the Communist Party – except briefly in
its preamble, which declares the Party’s role in leading the Chinese people
of all nationalities. Liberal elements were kept and amplified from previous
versions. Article 2 says that “the organs through which the people exercise
state power are the National People’s Congress and the local people’s con-
gresses at different levels.” Article 35 promises the “freedom of speech, of
the press, of assembly, of association, of procession, and of demonstration.”
Article 36 protects the “freedom of religious belief.”
The problem, however, is the lack of implementation. Although the con-
stitution in theory limits state power and protects a number of liberal rights,
it lacks any meaningful mechanism for enforcement. Peking University legal
scholar Zhang Qianfan (张千帆) described China’s Constitution as a “dead
letter,” contrary to a “living constitution” that “virtually ‘grows’ as it is ap-
plied and adapted to the changing social reality.” (5) For instance, although
the Chinese Constitution protects freedom of assembly and association, the
government almost never grants applications for public assembly. In addi-
tion, so far there has been only one case of judicial application of the Con-
stitution in Chinese courts. In 2001, the Supreme People’s Court ruled that
Qi Yuling would receive a remedy for an alleged violation of her right to ed-
ucation as provided by the Constitution – the first time in history that a
constitutional provision was cited as the legal basis for a judicial decision.
Although this ground-breaking application was rendered as “China’s Mar-
bury case,” it was also the last case in which the court invoked constitutional
provisions. (6) Rumours even held that the Supreme People’s Court issued an
internal directive forbidding courts from “judicialising the Constitution” (xi-
anfa sifahua 宪法司法化). (7)
Neither is there any permanent mechanism for challenging laws and re-
solving clashes between legal provisions. Unlike in the West, China does not
have either a constitutional court or a constitution-interpreting judiciary,
though courts do have some power to review specific administrative ac-
tions. (8) Although a special committee has been set up within the Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) since 2002 to review
laws for their constitutionality, it has not yet ruled any law unconstitutional,
except, arguably, in one case: the Sun Zhigang incident in 2003, which
sparked a public outcry, forced the State Council to rescind the Custody and
Repatriation regulations that allowed police to detain persons without resi-
dency permits. The decision came after the Standing Committee of the NPC
stated that it would rule such regulations unconstitutional if they were not
rescinded. In the end, a formal constitutional review was still avoided.
Despite four subsequent constitutional amendments (9) and the trend to-
ward more Chinese citizens referring to constitutional provisions as tools
of “rightful resistance,” (10) the failure to enforce the Constitution makes it
fair to say that China has “a constitution without constitutionalism” (and
as will be shown, this very point is turned into a question-begging argument
for rejecting constitutionalism). One major reason, as Zhang Qianfan puts
it, is that enforcing the Constitution “would have triggered pervasive con-
flicts of interests.” For example, just compensating people removed from
their lands will translate into a reduction in government revenues and the
personal gains of officials. Taking elections seriously will result in Party of-
ficials losing their offices, and hence their power and rewards. Both offend
the status quo and disturb stability, and none are desirable for the Party
leadership. 
Liberals calling for constitutional
government
In spite of the rigid political atmosphere in post-Tiananmen China, liberals’
calls for constitutional government have surfaced from time to time. One
notable example was Charter 08, a manifesto published in 2008 and signed
by more than 350 Chinese intellectuals and activists. The bold manifesto,
which drew inspiration from the anti-Soviet Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia,
demanded constitutional government, electoral democracy, and the elimi-
nation of one-party rule. One of its drafters, Liu Xiaobo, was awarded a
Nobel Peace Prize, but the Charter also antagonised the Party leadership,
who punished Liu with an 11-year jail sentence for “subverting state power.”
Another proposal, which adopted more concrete and less subversive
terms than Charter 08, appeared on the Internet on 25 December 2012.
Known as the “Proposal for a Consensus on Reform” (gaige gongshi changyi
shu 改革共识倡议书), the statement was drafted by legal scholar Zhang
Qianfan and supported by more than 70 prominent liberal intellectuals
and activists. (11) The carefully crafted statement demanded the enforce-
ment of the Chinese Constitution and a proper definition of the relationship
between the Party and the government. It called for the full implementa-
tion of intra-party democracy as well as more transparency and openness
in administrative affairs. It championed judicial independence, urged local
courts to delink from local finances, and proposed the establishment of an
independent constitutional court in the People’s Congress. Despite its mod-
erate recommendations, the petition, which was posted by Zhang on his
blog and widely circulated on Weibo, was soon removed and censored by
state authorities.
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Current affairs
The censored petition created dramatic repercussions in the following
weeks. Southern Weekend (Nanfang Zhoumo 南方周末), a Guangzhou news-
paper known for its progressive attitude, planned its 2013 New Year issue
with an opening essay boldly entitled “Chinese Dream, the Dream for Con-
stitutional Government” (中国梦，宪政梦). (12) The essay regarded China’s
current quest for constitutional government as an unfinished historical en-
terprise and associated this goal with Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream,” a strategy
weaving high-level official rhetoric with liberal demands for political opening.
This, however, struck the nerves of the Party leadership. State propaganda
authorities immediately ordered Southern Weekly editors to undertake sev-
eral drastic revisions before they agreed on a sanitised final version, in which
all 17 mentions of “constitutionalism” (xianzheng 宪政) were removed. (13)
Around the same time, Yanhuang Chunqiu (炎黄春秋), a liberal Beijing mag-
azine, published an opening piece called “Constitutional Government is the
Consensus for Political Structural Reform” (宪法是政治体制改革的共识),
which was similar to the title of the December petition. (14) Unlike Southern
Weekly’s poignant tone, the latter adopted a legal perspective and urged the
authorities to implement the neglected constitutional clauses. In response,
state censors blocked the magazine’s website for two weeks. (15)
The censorship of both publications, one in Guangdong and another in
Beijing, shows that there is no regional difference in terms of the Party’s in-
tolerance of high-profile support for constitutional government. Rather than
localised reactions from provincial party bosses, the concerted nature of
the censorship effort suggested that it was more likely a decision from the
Party centre to drive out liberal voices. Liberal activist Wen Yunchao, who
writes as Beifeng (北风), said in an interview that the Southern Weekend
affair resulted from journalists’ “miscalculation of Xi’s stance towards dis-
sent,” which “led some in Beijing to believe there was an opportunity to
raise the bar and take to the street with placards.” (16)
Counterattacks from party conservatives
Counterattacks from party conservatives targeting constitutionalism
began to gather pace in May 2013 with the support of state media. Ironi-
cally, this conservative turn came as a “surprise,” as it followed the arrest of
the neo-Maoist ex-Chongqing chief Bo Xilai, a move that might have
seemed like a liberal turn in Chinese politics. In early May, overseas media
reported that the central government had ordered higher education insti-
tutions to obey the “Seven Don’t Speaks” (qibujiang 七不讲), which banned
teachers from discussing universal values, press freedom, civil society, civil
rights, the Party’s historical mistakes, the privileged capitalist class, and ju-
dicial independence. (17) Another party document advanced 16 points aimed
at increasing control of the political quality of young teachers in higher in-
stitutions. The document, which appeared at the end of May, was originally
dated early May – around the time that the “Seven Don’t Speaks” was
leaked – which led analysts to link them together. (18)
These leaked edicts set the scene for two waves of counterattacks against
constitutionalism. The first wave came around late May as Renmin University
law professor Yang Xiaoqing (杨晓青) wrote a long piece in Red Flag Manu-
scripts entitled the “Comparative Study of Constitutional Government and
the People’s Democratic Regime” (宪政与人民民主制度之比较研究), which
was reposted on the Seeking Truth website. (19) The article contrasts the con-
stitutional government of Western democracies with the People’s Democracy
(renmin minzhu zhidu 人民民主制度) in China, arguing that “constitutional-
ism belongs to capitalism, but not socialism.” On the same day, Global Times,
a hawkish Party newspaper, ran an editorial criticising constitutionalism as a
roundabout route to repudiating China’s developmental path. (20) On 29 May,
Party Construction (dangjian 党建), a journal published by the Propaganda
Department, published an essay entitled “Recognise the Basic Nature of ‘Con-
stitutionalism’” (认清“宪政”的本质) which described constitutionalism as a
“discursive trap.” The author, Zheng Zhixue (郑志学), was likely a pseudonym
– as suggested by its Chinese homophone meaning “political science”
(zhengzhi xue 政治学). (21) In June, Red Flag published an essay by Wang
Tingyou (汪亭友) called “A Few Thoughts on the Question of Constitution-
alism” (对宪政问题的一些看法), which attacked constitutionalism as “a
means of abolishing the leadership of the CCP and the socialist system.” (22)
State media returned to silence until a second wave began in late July and
peaked in mid-August. In July, new left intellectuals Hu Angang (胡鞍钢)
and Wang Shaoguang (王绍光) challenged the idea of civil society in two
separate essays. The former piece, entitled “Why People’s Society is superior
to Civil Society” (人民社会为何优于公民社会) and published in People’s
Daily Overseas Edition, brought up the notion of the People’s Society in
which the core undertaking is to improve citizens’ welfare (minsheng民生)
by adopting the mass line (qunzhong luxian 群众路线). (23) The latter, Wang’s
“‘Civil Society’ is a Crude Neoliberal Myth” (「公民社会」是新自由主义编
造的粗糙神话), which appeared in People’s Forum, discredited civil society
as an ill-defined concept fabricated by neo-liberalism. (24) On 1 August, on-
line commentator Wang Xiaoshi (王小石) posted a provocative piece called
“If China descends into unrest, the situation can only be worse than the So-
viet Union” (中国若动荡，只会比苏联更惨) on the official Xinhua Net. (25)
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In this demagogical and widely circulated piece, Wang attacked public in-
tellectuals for plotting to replace China’s socialism with the Western “cap-
italist and constitutional model.” He argued that if China were to
democratise, the consequences would be much worse than for the resource-
rich Russia after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Global Times’ edi-
torial on 5 August largely agreed with Wang’s view, saying that it is
“consistent with the mainstream of Chinese society.” (26)
The Party’s offensive soon reached its peak. From 5 August, People’s Daily
Overseas Edition ran front-page editorials for three consecutive days criti-
cising constitutional government. (27) Mostly repackaging arguments from
previous critiques heightened by an uncompromising tone, these essays ar-
gued that constitutionalism is not only incompatible with Chinese socialism
but also susceptible to a Western – principally US – plot to subvert the Com-
munist Party. All three were written by a certain Ma Zhongcheng (马钟成),
described as a Senior Research Fellow of the Hainan-based “Oceanic Secu-
rity and Cooperation Institute.” Analysts believe that Ma is probably not a
real person but rather the Chinese short-form of “loyal to Marxism”
(zhongcheng yu makesi zhuyi 忠诚于马克思主义). (28) On 19 and 20 August,
the website of Party journal Seeking Truth reposted two articles from Hai-
jiang Online (海疆在线), a leftist website also based in Hainan. The essays,
written by Gao Xiang (高翔) and Zheng Li (郑里), ferociously criticised con-
stitutionalism as a “challenge against the spirit of the 18th National Con-
gress” and a “US conspiracy to infiltrate China.” (29) Both authors were
Research Fellows in the same institution where Ma worked. Details of the
institute were not available online, but insiders claimed that this covert or-
ganisation has strong ties to the military. (30) More recently, in mid-October,
Seeking Truth (求是) published a lead article under the name of Qiu Shi (秋
石), calling for the “consolidation of ideological foundation” in the Party and
among the people (巩固党和人民团结奋斗的共同思想基础) and also at-
tacking the ideas of universal values, Western democracy, and constitutional
government. (31)
These criticisms generally fall into three lines of argument. The first is to
argue that having a constitution does not necessarily entail constitutional-
ism. Accordingly, China already has a robust constitution, and has been rec-
tified and improved according to new circumstances. As the highest law,
the constitution specifies the basic political structure of the state and en-
shrines the basic rights and freedoms to be enjoyed by its citizens. All indi-
viduals and institutions, including the Communist Party itself, ought to
govern the state according to the Constitution (yixian zhiguo 依宪治国) and
all other laws (yifa zhiguo 依法治国). This, however, is different from imple-
menting constitutionalism as a political system, because there is no inherent
relation between constitution and constitutionalism. As Yang Xiaoqing ar-
gues, polities can have a constitution without constitutionalism, for example
the late Qing, while some polities can have constitutionalism without a
constitution, like the United Kingdom. (32)
On the contrary, the argument goes, constitutionalism is a political doc-
trine (zhengzhi zhuzhang 政治主张) produced by capitalist systems. Found
on the basis of capitalist market economy and private property, it exercises
the separation of powers, parliamentary and representative democracy, and
judicial independence. Although these political designs could limit the power
of the state to a considerable extent, they are vulnerable to the dominant
influence of the capitalist class. Worse still, majoritarian politics might also
lead to the blatant infringement of minority rights. As China is a socialist
state where the political and socio-economic system is drastically different
from (and superior to) Western constitutional democracies, constitutional-
ism is not compatible with China. Hence, there is no need for any mention
of the term “constitutionalism,” even the politically correct “socialist con-
stitutionalism” (shehui zhuyi xianzheng 社会主义宪政), because China’s so-
cialism has already absorbed the non-essential elements of
constitutionalism, such as human rights, equality before the law, market
economy, and press freedom, into its “Chinese characteristics.” And even as
Mao Zedong had mentioned the need for constitutional government before
1949, he attached the idea to New Democracy and distinguished it from
that of capitalist and socialist democracy. With the triumph of the Com-
munist Party in 1949, new-democratic constitutionalism was replaced by
the “People’s Democratic Dictatorship” (renmin minzhu zhuanzheng 人民
民主专政).
The second category of arguments is that China’s political system is
unique and superior to Western democracies, thus incompatible with con-
stitutionalism. Contrary to Western constitutional governments, China prac-
tises what is known as the People’s democratic system (renmin minzhu
zhidu 人民民主制度). It exercises public ownership at the core, though al-
lowing some degree of private property. Besides, the state represents “the
basic interests of the broadest number of people.” There are no factions, no
other power-sharing parties, and no interest groups. All power comes from
the people, and is in turn vested in the Communist Party. Thus state power
is unified, contrary to the separation of powers, and is exercised through
the People’s Congress, which is popularly elected by the people and unifies
legislative and executive power. The judiciary is not independent. According
to the official line, the judiciary ought to exercise its functions independ-
ently according to the law (依法独立行使职权), and must accept the polit-
ical, ideological, and organisational leadership of the Communist Party. The
legitimacy of the Party comes from the revolution rather than elections.
The military must be placed under the leadership of the Party. The idea of
civil society must give way to a more superior people’s society, which truly
represents the interest of the people. 
The third is to argue that the campaign for constitutionalism is a Western
conspiracy to reject China’s developmental path and subvert the rule of the
CCP. It holds that the term “constitutionalism” is a discursive trap (huayu
xianjing 话语陷阱). Once people are allowed to adopt it, China will be led
by the thinking behind it and have its system entirely transformed. People’s
Daily’s Ma Zhongcheng put this rather concisely. In his first essay, “‘Consti-
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tutionalism’ is Essentially a Weapon in a Public Opinion War,” Ma argued
that “constitutionalism” – even in its moderate form as socialist constitu-
tionalism – is a trap set up by the United States to weaken China. According
to Ma, China’s current situation was similar to the Soviet Union’s in the
1980s when Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, and their legal theorists pro-
moted the ideas of socialist constitutionalism, which he saw as weapons of
the ideological and psychological war waged by the US. In the end, consti-
tutionalism “abolished the socialist factor in the Soviet Constitution, abol-
ished the leadership role of the Communist Party, and disintegrated the
Soviet Union,” and led to a series of “shock therapies” in the early 1990s. In
this respect, China’s discourse on constitutionalism was no different. Sup-
porters were “funded by a number of US charitable foundations that are in
turn backed by American intelligence agencies.” The Contemporary Global
Comparative Constitutional History Research (当代世界比较宪政史研究)
was singled out as an example funded by the Ford Foundation. (33)
Liberals’ rebuttal – with the Party’s tacit
consent?
While the debate has been largely dominated by conservative writings,
liberals and certain open-minded Party theorists have found space to fight
back – although their outlets are limited to the Internet and liberal presses.
On 23 May, Caijing Online published an article called “Constitutionalism is
What Countries under Rule of Law Should Be About” (宪政是法治国家应有
之义). (34) The article, posted by liberal political commentator Zhang Lifan 
(章立凡), was in fact an old piece written in 2008 by Xu Chongde (许崇德),
a famous Chinese constitutional theorist who helped draft the 1982 Con-
stitution. In June, Singapore’s Lianhe Zaobao (联合早报) interviewed Chinese
legal scholar He Weifang (贺卫方), who urged Xi to stand by his promise
and implement the Constitution. (35) Another article, entitled “Avoiding Con-
stitutionalism Means Cutting Off the Road Forward for China” (拒绝宪政是
断绝中国的前途) and written by scholar Feng Chongyi (冯崇义) and writer
Yang Hengjun (杨恒均), was circulated on the Internet, arguing that the
question of constitutionalism was a matter of life and death for China. (36)
Most notably, Cai Xia (蔡霞), an outspoken professor and reform advocate
in the Central Party School, published two articles in defence of constitu-
tionalism. The first, published on 30 May and entitled “Promoting Constitu-
tional Democracy should be the Ruling Mission of the CCP” (推进宪政民主
应该是中国共产党的执政使命), was intended to rebut Yang Xiaoqing’s arti-
cle. (37) The second, a 30,000-word piece that appeared three weeks later 
(推进宪政民主关键在党症结也在党), warned that if the Party refuses polit-
ical reform it will lose the opportunity to reform altogether. (38) Numerous
other articles in support of constitutionalism also appeared on the Internet,
written by authors such as Jiang Ping (江平), Hua Bingxiao (华炳啸), Tong
Zhiwei (童之伟 ), Guo Daohui (郭道晖 ), Wang Jianxun (王建勋 ), Wang
Zhanyang (王占阳), Zhang Qianfan (张千帆), Rong Jian (荣剑), and Hu De-
ping (胡德平). Yanhuang Chunqiu devoted its September issue to constitu-
tionalism. Even Study Times, the official publication of the Central Party
School, published a piece on 5 August that urged the ruling party to kick-
start political reform. (39)
It is hard to predict the future course of the debate, but so far we are able
to make three observations. First, the fact that a debate was unleashed in
the first place and dragged on for some time implies that Party leaders, pos-
sibly even Xi Jinping, have given tacit endorsement. It shows that the new
leadership has broken the tradition of “not arguing” (buzhenglun 不争论)
about ideology and political reform, which was set out by Deng Xiaoping in
the post-Tiananmen decade and carried forward by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jin-
tao until most recently. Why Xi has chosen to break with tradition, at least
partially, is not clear; but his recent policies of mass line rectification and
Maoist indoctrination suggest that ideology might play a much more im-
portant role in the polity than under his predecessors. Seen in this light, the
constitutional debate might be a prelude to the revival of ideological guid-
ance under Xi Jinping’s administration. 
Second, while conservative voices have dominated the debate through
what seems to be a premeditated media campaign, the fact that liberals
were able to mount a dignified defence – unscathed by the powerful cen-
sorship machinery – suggest that the Party leadership is willing to tolerate
liberal opinions to a certain extent. In addition, counterattacks have not yet
made it to the highest level of Party propaganda. Experts on Chinese media
Qian Gang and David Bandurski both pointed out that the highest level of
attack against constitutionalism came from People’s Daily Overseas Edition,
which is not on par with the most official mouthpiece, People’s Daily, (40)
although in a later article Qian referred to the repeated mention of “strug-
gling against public opinion” (yulun douzheng 舆论斗争) in a more recent
op-ed piece in People’s Daily, suggesting that the attack might be climbing
up to a higher level. (41) The more recent essay in Seeking Truth further con-
firms the trend. On the other hand, however, public discussion on the topic
faced much harsher restrictions. As the offensive against constitutionalism
began to fuel Internet discussions, government censors quickly blocked the
term “constitutionalism” on Weibo. This shows that state authorities can
tolerate the discussion on the condition that it remains on an intellectual
level without evolving into open public discussion that might induce mo-
bilisation. 
Third, while it is not clear to what extent the Party leadership rejects the
idea of constitutionalism, some leaders – if not all – have revealed their
preference for tighter control on activists and civil society in the past year.
There are credibly-sourced rumours that the Party Central has sent down
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an internal memo “Concerning the Situation in the Ideological Sphere” 
(关于当前意识形态领域情况的通报), also known as Document No. 9, warn-
ing Party cadres against seven perils that might lead to the downfall of the
Communist Party, the first of which was purportedly Western constitutional
democracy. (42) It was allegedly the guiding thought behind the “Seven Don’t
Speaks,” the ban against the discussion of seven topics in schools. The recent
campaign-style crackdown against civil society activists and online celebri-
ties is yet another indication of the Party’s resolution to rein in free expres-
sion. It shows that, after all, Xi Jinping and his colleagues are not as liberal
as people – perhaps wilfully – anticipated. Even if there will be some form
of political reform, it will be limited in scale and largely constrained by re-
sistance from within the Party.
Conclusion: What does the debate mean for
ordinary citizens?
Whether or not, and to what extent, Party leaders are willing to borrow
from constitutionalism will have drastic consequences on Chinese politics.
Espousing constitutional government might lead to less interference of the
Party into state affairs, possibly resulting in a less powerful state, a cleaner
government, a more independent judiciary, and more civil liberties – al-
though all require strong political will from the Party leadership to curb
vested interests and, more crucially, to relinquish its own despotic power.
Renouncing constitutional government, on the other hand, might result in
a tenser political climate than the status quo, as it requires more sophisti-
cated methods of political repression and social control to hold back an in-
creasingly restive and well-informed citizenry. So far the Party leadership
has not sent out clear and firm messages regarding the fate on constitu-
tionalism. (43) Until they take such a step, the debate on constitutionalism
could remain a largely intellectual exchange, and might not have many ram-
ifications for ordinary citizens – especially as state censorship has barred
them from participating in the discussion. Yet ironically, thanks to censorship
and the concerted media campaign to condemn constitutionalism, ordinary
citizens may have gained knowledge and understanding of such an obscure
notion. 
In any event, the prospect for constitutional government appears slim. As
recent developments suggest, the Communist Party continues to play an
active role in the everyday life of Chinese citizens, with party-building ac-
tivities growing rapidly in tandem with an expanding civil society. (44) “Ruling
the state according to law” continues to develop unique Chinese charac-
teristics. The recent anti-corruption campaign indicates that even though
the Party leadership pledged to fight corruption regardless of the lowly
“flies” and the high-flying “tigers,” the selective targeting of officials shows
that the anti-corruption drive is driven by ideology and campaign justice –
rather than by building institutions and adopting the rule of law. On the
other hand, while the unexpected transparency of the epic Bo Xilai trial
pleased some among the liberals, the authorities’ meticulous control of
what could be broadcasted and what would be censored from the trial sug-
gests a new model that utilises selective and tightly controlled transparency
to manage an increasingly inquisitive citizenry. 
Where all this will bring China with respect to the ideals of constitution-
alism remains something to be closely watched. As soon as Xi Jinping se-
cures a firm grip in power, or otherwise, more will become certain.
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